Putin's Ukraine irony

Putin’s military adventurism into Georgia in 2008 and the “bloodless” occupation and annexation of the Crimea in 2014 may have “seduced” him into believing that a war with Ukraine would be brief, relatively bloodless and that the Russian military would be greeted as “hero liberators.”

Perhaps, also, Putin believed the long, involved web of lies about the Ukraine government and its leaders, which his minions flooded into the international media.

Clearly, Putin had no appreciation for just how poorly his forces would do. He was oblivious to the weaknesses that widespread corruption, inadequate training and shortages of basic military logistical needs would mean in terms of combat preparedness and performance.

In what may be the perfect irony, the Ukraine military was engaged in a separatist war with Russian-backed elements in eastern and southeastern Ukraine since 2014.

Although there is a sense that conflict was a stalemate, it gave the Ukraine military eight years in which it accepted significant training and equipment. In effect, the Ukrainian military became an effective and modernly equipped force while the Russian-backed insurrectionists did not.

In addition, in those eight years, Russia’s actual military forces did not modernize, and because of the annual turnover of a military with significant conscription numbers (Russian men are required to spend one year on active duty), military training was suspect, at best.

Finally, as the Ukrainian military forces out-fought and out-performed the Russian combatants in almost every way, glaring evidence of corruption at all levels of the Russian military (from equipment development, manufacture and maintenance) became obvious.

Ironically, Putin’s proxy war in eastern and southeastern Ukraine from 2014 to the 2022 invasion may have ensured that the Ukraine military was better equipped, better trained, had more battlefield experience and was better suited to meet and defeat the Russian onslaught.

Perhaps even more surprising than the Ukrainian military’s success has been the ways in which Ukraine President Zelenskyy has measured up to the challenges placed on him. Almost overnight, he became a national hero. He rallied the entire country into an iron fist of political, economic and military defense.

President Zelenskyy’s dedication to staying in Kyiv, his refusal to accept any notion of defeat or surrender, his international appeals to legislative bodies and TV audiences around the world, and his trips to the various battlefields have gone a long way in bolstering Ukraine and its people. He has been an important part of the outcome so far.

On the other hand, Putin’s appearances have been far from inspiring. In addition, his raising the unthinkable specter of nuclear war has unsettled the entire world.

The shock-and-awe battle plan simply did not work. Instead of the Russian version of Blitzkrieg resulting in a quick and overwhelming victory, the shock and awe steeled the Ukrainian people. Nearly everything the Russian military tried resulted, mostly, in failures.

Hence, the Russian use of force against innocent and largely unprotected civilians and their cities. The entire world has viewed the consequences of this war against the elderly, the young and the non-military, including the destruction of hospitals, schools and other non-combatant sites and entities.

No matter what the total history and present circumstances are for Putin and his military, there is one overriding problem: There is no easy way out.

– Hal Mansfield, emeritus professor, Fort Lewis College